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Stakey: Nassar's Heightened Retaliation Standard

THE SUPREME COURT’S HEIGHTENED RETALIATION
STANDARD IN NASSAR: A PRUDENT LIMITATION OR A
MISGUIDED RESTRICTION TO TITLE VII CLAIMS?
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar1
(decided June 24, 2013)
While suspect class status-based discrimination claims and
activity-based retaliation claims were once governed by “motivating
factor” causation, in a landmark decision, the United States Supreme
Court recently ruled that “but-for” causation must be used to establish
claims of activity-based employment discrimination.2 However, the
Court declined to raise the standard for suspect status-based discrimination claims and left American jurists with several unanswered
questions. Will valid Title VII claims based wholly on circumstantial
evidence still have the resilience to survive the prima facie stage?
What are the implications for related state claims? Are all employment discrimination claims destined to require this higher standard of
proof? United States district courts now face the challenge of interpreting the legal consequences of the Supreme Court ruling and applying a higher standard of review.
I.

CONTEXT OF THE COURT DECISION

An extensive review of the Court’s holding indicates that judicial resource concerns influenced the decision to make it harder for
Title VII claims to survive summary judgment. Exploration of the
history and context surrounding this most recent Supreme Court decision may shed light on the thrust and momentum of labor law and
civil rights issues in America today. A full appreciation of the implications of this heightened causation standard requires an examination
of the controversy that gave rise to the momentous change.
1
2

133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
Id. at 2520 (2013).
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Naiel Nassar is a “medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent
who specializes” in infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS
treatment.3 In 1995, he was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (“UTSMC”) to serve dual positions as both a
University faculty member and Associate Medical Director of the
Amelia Court HIV/AIDS Clinic at Parkland Hospital, a clinical
healthcare facility affiliated with the University.4 After taking a sabbatical for additional medical training from 1998 to 2001, Dr. Nassar
resumed his position at the hospital and returned to the University as
an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases.5
His employment continued without incident until 2004.6
For Dr. Nassar, everything changed in June 2004, when
UTSMC hired Dr. Beth Levine as the Chief of Infectious Disease
Medicine, a position which made her Nassar’s ultimate supervisor.7
From the start, Nassar claims that Levine treated him differently than
she treated his colleagues, interrogating him for one-and-one-half
hours with a long line of questions, while speaking with other staff
members for only fifteen or twenty minutes, during her initial interviews with the faculty.8 Nassar claims that Levine disproportionately
criticized his productivity and effectiveness and unjustifiably scrutinized his billing practices.9 Nassar also claims that, toward the end
of 2005, when UTSMC considered hiring a physician of Middle
Eastern descent, Levine remarked that “Middle Easterners are lazy”
and that she successfully opposed the hiring of that physician by the
University.10 Upon learning that Parkland Hospital hired the physician independently of UTSMC, Levine reportedly commented that
the hospital had “hired another one,” which was taken to mean “another person . . . who is Muslim and who is dark-skinned.”11
UTSMC painted a decidedly different picture of the facts,
stating that Levine was rarely even on site because she focused on re3

Id. at 2523.
Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517
(2013) (No. 12-484) [hereinafter Petitioner].
5
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2523.
6
Brief for Respondent at 4, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517
(2013) (No. 12-484) [hereinafter Respondent].
7
Id.
8
Id. at 5.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Respondent, supra note 6, at 5-6.
4
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search, not patient care.12 When she was at the HIV/AIDS Clinic,
UTSMC claimed that Levine not only gave Nassar the highest evaluation ratings and praise, but even suggested that Nassar seek a promotion and submitted a recommendation letter on his behalf. 13 However, Nassar was dissatisfied with Levine’s recommendation and
believed Levine was actually attempting to delay his promotion.14
Thus, beginning in 2005, Nassar began exploring the possibility of
working for Parkland Hospital directly, rather than continuing via his
UTSMC faculty position under Levine.15 This move proved to be
problematic for everyone involved.
Nassar’s proposal to leave UTSMC and to work solely for
Parkland Hospital was initially met with opposition.16 Pursuant to an
affiliation agreement between the school and the hospital, as well as
to Parkland Hospital’s rules and bylaws, physicians at the hospital
were required to be faculty members of UTSMC to satisfy the criteria
for the institution’s designation as a teaching hospital.17 Still, negotiations continued with at least one member of the hospital, who told
Nassar that if he were to resign from the medical school, there would
be “no reason for [the hospital] not to employ” him.18
Spurred on by a verbal employment offer, salary negotiations
and e-mail exchanges detailing the steps necessary to finalize his direct employment with Parkland Hospital, Nassar submitted his formal
resignation from UTSMC in July 2006.19 In actuality, Parkland Hospital had yet to officially offer Nassar a position by this time, and although an offer had been drafted with a tentative starting date of July
10, 2006, this offer letter was unsigned and unsent when Nassar resigned from the school on July 3.20
In his resignation letter, Nassar wrote that continued harassment and discrimination by Levine were the main reasons for his departure and alleged that Levine’s attitude “stems from religious, racial and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims that have resulted in

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Petitioner, supra note 4, at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Respondent, supra note 6, at 6.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524.
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 8.
Id. at 8-9; Respondent, supra note 6, at 6.
Respondent, supra note 6, at 6.
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 9.
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a hostile work environment.”21 The letter sent shock waves through
the hospital, prompting numerous discussions about how to address
the issue.22 While some hospital staff members wanted Nassar to “sit
tight,” others, including Dr. Gregory Fitz, Nassar’s direct supervisor,
expressed consternation over the allegations.23 Fitz told another employee that Levine had been “publicly humiliated” by the letter and
that it was “very important that she be publicly exonerated.”24 At trial, this employee testified that Fitz admitted to blocking Nassar’s
employment at the hospital in retaliation for sending the resignation
letter.25 Negotiations permanently ceased less than a month later,
when Nassar accepted a job in California near the end of July 2006.26
II.

LITIGATION AND THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

Pursuing his claim against the school, and in an effort to exhaust all administrative remedies, Nassar filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which found
“credible, testimonial evidence” of discriminatory animus and retaliation.27 Nassar then brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, alleging two distinct violations of Title VII—constructive discharge and retaliation.28 Nassar’s claim for
constructive discharge, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,29 was based on the allegation that Levine’s racially and religiously motivated harassment effectively forced him to resign.30 His
second claim, under section 2000e-3(a), was based upon Fitz’s having prevented Parkland Hospital from hiring Nassar, in retaliation for
complaining about Levine’s harassment.31
The trial was bifurcated and, after a charge conference for the
liability phase, a dispute arose between the parties regarding the ap-

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Respondent, supra note 6, at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524.
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10.
Id.
Respondent, supra note 6, at 8.
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10-11.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2013).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524.
Id.
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propriate jury instructions for Nassar’s retaliation claim.32 UTSMC
initially submitted its proposed jury instructions with a retaliation
charge that would have allowed for a finding of liability if there was
a mixed-motive for the adverse action against Nassar.33 Thus, it is
not surprising that, when the charge conference took place on May
21, 2010, UTSMC did not object to the mixed-motive retaliation instruction that was ultimately agreed upon.34 However, on May 24,
the day the jury was to be charged, counsel for UTSMC asked the
district court for permission to raise a new objection to the causation
standard of the retaliation charge.35 Instead of the mixed-motive retaliation charge, UTSMC asked for instructions which would hold it
liable for retaliation only if Fitz’s action was the “but-for” cause of
Nassar’s barred employment, i.e., that Fitz would have approved
Nassar’s direct employment with Parkland Hospital absent the retaliatory animus created by Nassar’s complaint of discrimination.36 The
trial court rejected this request in light of precedent, decided little
more than a month earlier, which held that a heightened causation
standard was inappropriate for Title VII claims.37 Regardless, the
court stated that the objection had “probably” been waived, since the
deadline for objections had passed.38 Ultimately, the district court’s
instructions were that, to establish liability, Nassar had to prove that
retaliation was a motivating factor for UTSMC’s conduct, although
other factors might have been a consideration.39
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Nassar on both the constructive discharge and retaliation claims.40 At the subsequent damages phase, the trial court instructed the jury on UTSMC’s affirmative defense, namely that the school would not be liable for damages
or back pay if it showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
would have taken the same action absent a retaliatory motive. 41 The
jury found that UTSMC did not carry its burden of showing that it
32

Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11; Respondent, supra note 6, at 8.
Respondent, supra note 6, at 8.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 8-9.
36
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11.
37
Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 333 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating then-current precedent
for issuing mixed-motive jury instructions).
38
Respondent, supra note 6, at 9.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.; Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11.
33
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would have taken the same action without considering the protected
activity.42 It awarded Nassar $436,168 in back pay and $3,187,500 in
damages, which the district court reduced to $300,000, in accordance
with Title VII’s cap on compensatory damages.43 The court also
awarded $489,927.50 in attorney’s fees.44
UTSMC moved for a directed verdict on the basis of its affirmative defense, but the trial court denied the motion, noting the existence of “a great deal of evidence on both sides.”45 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit vacated the constructive discharge verdict, concluding
that Nassar failed to prove an aggravating factor necessary to establish the claim.46 As for the retaliation claim, the court of appeals upheld the verdict, explaining that the jury “heard conflicting evidence
about the timing and motivation of Fitz’s opposition” and resolved
the conflict against UTSMC.47 This affirmation was based on the
theory that retaliation claims under Section 2000e-3(a) were governed by the same standard that applied to status-based discrimination claims under Section 2000e-2(a)—motivating factor causation.48
Having disallowed some of Nassar’s damages, the Fifth Circuit then
remanded the case back to the district court for a new trial on the correct measure of damages for the retaliation verdict.49
UTSMC then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en
banc on the issue of the mixed-motive retaliation instruction, but the
court denied rehearing by a vote of 9-6.50 Judge Smith, joined by
three dissenting judges, supported UTSMC’s position in his dissent,
asserting that Smith v. Xerox Corp.,51 with its lowered standard of
causation, was “an erroneous interpretation of the statute and controlling caselaw” that should be overruled.52 At the same time, Judge Elrod concurred for an entirely different reason, based on the Universi-

42

Id.
Respondent, supra note 6, at 10.
44
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11.
45
Respondent, supra note 6, at 10.
46
Nassar v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211, 211 (5th Cir. 2012); Petitioner,
supra note 4, at 12.
47
Respondent, supra note 6, at 10.
48
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing Smith, 602 F.3d at 330).
49
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 12.
50
Nassar, 688 F.3d at 211.
51
602 F.3d at 330.
52
Nassar, 688 F.3d at 213 (Smith, J., dissenting).
43
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ty’s waiver.53 By not objecting in a timely manner to the motivating
factor jury instruction during the charge conference, Judge Elrod
concluded that UTSMC waived its chance to make the argument on
appeal, a fact which was compounded by UTSMC’s own concession
that Smith was controlling and would have foreclosed its objection to
the mixed-motive charge on the merits.54 And yet, Judge Smith came
to the opposite conclusion, that the objection was preserved, citing
the Federal Rules55 and UTSMC’s use of but-for causation as an affirmative defense.56 The Fifth Circuit’s denial was followed by a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.57
In its petition to the United States Supreme Court, UTSMC
argued that the “case should begin and end with” the plain language
of the statutory text.58 Under the Court’s reading of Title VII, a
plaintiff should have to prove that retaliation was “the reason” for an
adverse employment action, i.e., was its “but-for” cause.59 According
to UTSMC, Congress’s selective tailoring of protected classes in the
1991 Civil Rights Act amendments to Title VII was intentionally
written to exclude the remaining provisions, namely retaliation.60
Basically, it argued that the 1991 amendments should be seen as a
case of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.61
UTSMC consistently rested its arguments on a foundation laid
by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.62 and argued that the materially identical language of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 196763 (“ADEA”) requires plaintiffs to prove but-for causation, so the same text in Title VII should also utilize this standard.64
Further, UTSMC contended that a failure to extend the Gross standard to retaliation claims would be “a jurisprudential step backward,”
and stressed the public policy reasons for abandoning a mixed-motive
53

Id. at 211 (Elrod, J., concurring).
Id. at 211-12.
55
FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)-(c).
56
Nassar, 688 F.3d, at 214 n.1 (Smith, J., dissenting).
57
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 979, 979 (2013).
58
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 14.
59
Id. at 13; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
60
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 13.
61
The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
62
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
63
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (making it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age.”) (emphasis added).
64
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 13.
54
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burden shifting analysis.65 By proclaiming the simplicity of Gross,
UTSMC sought to supplant the framework of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,66 which complicated matters by allowing the employee to
prevail when a discriminatory motive was a motivating factor in an
employment decision, but nevertheless relieving the employer of liability if it could show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employment decision would have been made absent the unlawful reason.67
UTSMC attacked Price Waterhouse, which was adopted in
part and vacated in part by Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, citing Justice Kennedy’s dissent, which predicted that the framework
would “result in confusion” and “more disarray in an area of the law
already difficult for the bench and bar.”68 Under Price Waterhouse,
as refined by the 1991 Act, “a plaintiff [may] obtain declaratory relief, attorney’s fees, and costs . . . based solely on proof that race,
color, religion, sex, or national[ origin] was a motivating factor in” an
adverse employment action, subject to what is essentially a but-for
affirmative defense that relieves the employer of liability for damages
if it can prove it would have made the decision without the improper
motivation.69 UTSMC argued that this framework was complex, impractical, and susceptible to abuse, as mixed-motives are easy to allege and subjective intent is difficult to disprove.70
Instead, UTSMC advocated the adoption of the causation
standard in Gross, to be governed by the burden shifting test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.71 Under this framework, the plaintiff-employee bears the initial burden and must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence.72 “The burden then [] shift[s] to the employer to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”73 Once the employer has stated a valid reason, the burden
shifts again, and the employee must then “demonstrate by competent
65

Id.
490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
67
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 28.
68
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Petitioner, supra note 4,
at 25.
69
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
70
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 30-31.
71
Id. at 28 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
72
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
73
Id.
66
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evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for rejection were in
fact a coverup for a [ ] discriminatory reason.”74
By adopting the but-for standard of Gross and using the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to establish proof,
the Court, UTSMC urged, could avoid all the uncertainties that dogged the Price Waterhouse test.75 According to UTSMC, Title VII retaliation, the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 should all be
governed by a but-for causation standard.76 Finally, in light of its argument to adopt a but-for standard, UTSMC believed that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, given the facts, under its suggested framework.77
In his reply petition to the United States Supreme Court,
Nassar echoed the sentiments of Judge Elrod, arguing that the Court
should not decide the case on the merits because UTSMC forfeited its
challenge to the mixed-motive retaliation charge.78 If the Court were
to decide on the merits, Nassar presented two possible theories which
would resolve the case in his favor, both of which addressed the
amendments contained in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.79 Specifically,
Nassar’s counsel addressed the addition of sections 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B) to Title VII, which collectively codified the mixedmotive standard and limited-remedy affirmative defense.80
Nassar argued that, because it is unlawful for race, color, religion, sex, or national origin to be a motivating factor in employment
decisions, retaliation for activities taken in defense of any of these
protected statuses is equally unlawful.81 Essentially, “retaliation for
opposing discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic is
itself discrimination on that basis.”82 Nassar argued that this interpre74

Id. at 805.
Petitioner, supra note 4, at 28.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 35.
78
Respondent, supra note 6, at 11.
79
Id. at 11-12.
80
Id. at 12; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.”), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (“[if] respondent demonstrates
that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor, the court . . . shall not award damages.”).
81
Respondent, supra note 6, at 12.
82
Id.
75

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 4

932

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

tation would not only create uniformity, but also be consistent with
EEOC policy.83
In the alternative, even if the Court were to adopt UTSMC’s
interpretation of the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments, Nassar argued that retaliation claims would still be governed by the lesser
standard articulated in the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting analysis.84 Under that framework, an employee need only show a mixedmotivation for an adverse employment decision.85 Nassar also argued that the decision in Gross was specifically applied to ADEA age
discrimination claims, not to Title VII (another case of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius), and supported the assertion by quoting
the Gross opinion: “[courts] must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.”86 Nassar further highlighted the distinction between the ADEA and Title VII by noting that the ADEA actually
includes a provision that would immunize employers who discriminate based on age, so long as the decision was also based on “reasonable factors other than age.”87 Finally, even if the Court were to find
that the Gross standard applied, Nassar argued the case should be remanded for trial.88 Considering that the jury failed to accept
UTSMC’s affirmative defense under the but-for causation standard at
the damages phase, it is reasonable to believe that a jury instructed
under the but-for Gross standard would similarly find for Nassar at
the liability stage of a bifurcated trial.89
Not to be outdone, UTSMC, in its reply brief, refined its position and stressed that, under Gross, the 1991 amendments were dispositive evidence of Congressional intent to require a higher standard
of causation for retaliation claims.90 UTSMC began by noting that
both parties agreed that the Title VII retaliation provision contained
identical language to the ADEA age-discrimination provision.91 Be83

Id.
Id.
85
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (majority opinion).
86
Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393
(2008)).
87
Respondent, supra note 6, at 13; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(f).
88
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2517.
89
Respondent, supra note 6, at 13-14.
90
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517
(2013) (No. 12-484) [hereinafter Petitioner Reply].
91
Id.
84
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cause Gross required the ADEA provision to be proven by a but-for
standard of causation, it followed that the identical language of the
Title VII retaliation provision should require an identical causation
standard.92
Stating that its rationale was clear-cut, UTSMC argued that
the 1991 amendments only authorized mixed-motive treatment for
discrimination claims made on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin—not for claims of retaliation, which Congress specifically addressed in a different provision of Title VII.93 Further,
UTSMC charged Nassar’s counsel with attempting “to override Title
VII’s plain text and structure by relying on a line of decisions holding
that, when Congress has not specifically addressed retaliation, a
broad ‘general’ prohibition on class-based discrimination can be construed to encompass retaliation.”94 To UTSMC, Nassar’s argument
was fallacious because the Court had already determined that “Title
VII’s specificity makes it ‘vastly different’ from such general provisions.”95
Attacking Nassar’s reliance on Price Waterhouse, UTSMC
posited that the 1991 amendments and subsequent interpretation in
Gross had eliminated Price Waterhouse’s stare decisis effect, due to
both the purposeful division of status-based and conduct-based provisions contained in 42 U.S.C. section 2000e, et seq., and since the
1991 Civil Rights Act subsequently abrogated Price Waterhouse in
part.96 With those 1991 amendments, “Congress’s careful tailoring”
was intended to imply that only Title VII class-based discrimination
claims should be subject to a lower standard of causation.97 According to UTSMC, Nassar’s interpretation would force juries to apply up
to three different standards to any given controversy, something
UTSMC classified as “the worst of all worlds.”98
Also in its reply brief, UTSMC stressed the policy considerations for applying a more stringent standard of causation to retaliation
claims.99 Citing the potential for abuse, UTSMC pointed out that re-

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 20.
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taliation claims have become the single-most litigated type of discrimination claim.100 With the high costs of defending against even
meritless claims, shifting the burden of proof onto employers would
make the cost of doing business even higher.101 UTSMC also noted
that retaliation claims usually do not result in summary judgment under the mixed-motive standard, as the subjective nature of the claim
forces “defendant[s] to try to prove a negative.”102
Finally, in terms of public policy, UTSMC argued that applying a mixed-motive standard would render Title VII’s retaliation provision a “thought control bill.”103 Because it is inevitable that an employer will harbor some degree of hurt or resentment upon learning
of an employee complaint, it would be improper to assume that a material issue of fact exists when that umbrage played no meaningful
part in a subsequent adverse employment decision.104 To do so
would be tantamount to assuming employer malfeasance, and there is
no basis for this presumption within the context of routine employment decisions.105
As to the facts in the instant case, UTSMC argued that there
was no dispute that the school would have taken the same action, as it
had a clear policy requiring hospital physicians to be members of
UTSMC faculty.106 It had twice denied Nassar’s request to circumvent the policy before the impetus for retaliation even occurred.107
As a result, even if an improper retaliatory animus later became an
additional motive, that retaliation was irrelevant to the employment
decision.108 Thus, under what it called the “correct legal standard” of
but-for causation, UTSMC asked the Court to grant judgment as a
matter of law.109
100

Id.; see Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and the
Retail Litigation Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16-17, Univ. of Texas
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-484) (noting that 16,394 EEOC retaliation claims were filed in 1997, while 31,208 retaliation claims were filed with the EEOC
in 2012. Retaliation claims accounted for 38.1% of all discrimination charges filed in 2012.
Retaliation has been the most frequently alleged type of claim since 2009.).
101
Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 20.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 21.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 22.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 22-24.
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SPLIT DECISION

Nassar was argued before the Court on April 24, 2013, and
decided on June 24, 2013.110 Speaking for the majority in the 5-4 decision, Associate Justice Kennedy first delivered a preamble to establish the context of the decision.111 Before discussing the merits, he
began by affirming the basic premise that a plaintiff’s right to compensation was contingent upon the showing of a causal link between
the injury sustained and the wrong alleged.112 The standard of causation required then depends upon the wrong alleged.113
While noting that Title VII is the centerpiece of federal legislation geared toward prohibiting wrongful discrimination, the majority remarked on the distinction between its status-based versus activity-based forms.114 Citing Price Waterhouse, the Court affirmed that a
lesser standard was still appropriate for establishing status-based discrimination under Title VII.115 That is, to establish a claim based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, an employee need only
show that discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment
decision.116 With this in mind, the Court then addressed whether that
same standard of causation is applicable to claims of activity-based
discrimination, namely retaliation under section 2000e-3(a).117
In considering the appropriate standard, the Court looked to
its holding in Gross, as it related to the issue of causation for establishing age-based discrimination under the ADEA.118 However, the
standard in Gross was a higher barrier to plaintiffs, according to the
Court’s interpretation of the ADEA, as an employee had to show that
age discrimination was so closely related to an adverse employment
action that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the unlawful motive in order to establish liability.119 The Court found that
analysis and Gross’s standard of causation to be instructive in

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2518.
Id. at 2522.
Id.
Id. at 2525.
Id. at 2522-23.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
Id. at 2523.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nassar.120
After a brief recitation of the facts, the Court engaged in a
more thorough analysis of the legislative and jurisprudential histories
of causation as applied to tort law, noting that the usual standard of
proof required a plaintiff to show that harm would not have occurred
but for the defendant’s conduct.121 While recognizing that Price Waterhouse lessened the causation standard for status-based discrimination claims and that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified its framework in part, the Court nevertheless referred to Price Waterhouse and
the 1991 amendments as creating “a problem of causation.”122 The
majority found that the instruction provided by Gross, as it applied to
the ADEA, was an adequate solution to this problem and should
therefore provide the framework for Title VII retaliation claims, including Nassar.123
The balance of the majority opinion was almost entirely an
endorsement of UTSMC’s position. First, the Court found that, given
the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the ADEA and
Title VII retaliation provisions, it was proper to conclude, as in
Gross, that Nassar’s retaliation claim should require proof that retaliation was the but-for cause of an employment decision.124 Second,
although the Court acknowledged that retaliation fell within the definition of “unlawful employment practice[s],” the majority interpreted
section 2000e-2(m) not to cover all employment practices, but rather
only five of the seven discriminatory actions listed in the main provision—those related to status.125 Because the retaliation provision was
placed in a separate subsection, the majority reasoned that Congress
intended to distinguish between the two classes of discrimination because “[j]ust as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural choices.”126 The specificity of language
in Title VII also weighed in favor of the majority’s adoption of the
120

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
Id. at 2525; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 431 cmt. a (1934)
(discussing the distinction between cause in the philosophical sense and substantial cause for
determining liability).
122
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
123
Id. at 2527.
124
Id. at 2528.
125
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
126
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529.
121
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but-for standard.127 By enumerating the specific practices Congress
sought to prohibit under a motivating factor framework, it expressly
excluded retaliation; therefore, “it [would] be incorrect to infer that
Congress meant anything other than what the text does say on the
subject of retaliation.”128
Next, the Court discussed public policy reasons for adopting a
heightened causation standard for retaliation claims.129 Noting the
importance of a fair and responsible allocation of judicial resources
and the increasing frequency of retaliation claims, the majority predicted that adopting a lowered standard of causation would contribute
to the filing of frivolous claims.130 To illustrate this point, it posed a
hypothetical in which an employee, who knows that an adverse employment action is pending, makes an unfounded accusation of discrimination to forestall that adverse action.131 Once the adverse action does occur, the hypothetical employee could claim retaliation
and prevail under a mixed-motive standard of proof.132 Even if the
employer were to prevail, which would be difficult at the summary
judgment stage, the reputational and financial costs would be high for
an employer whose actions were not, in fact, the result of a discriminatory motive.133
The majority then rejected Nassar’s penultimate argument,
that of giving deference to EEOC guidelines, stating that the agency’s
explanations of the Title VII provision lacked the persuasive force
necessary to be given deference.134 Finally, the Court quickly dispensed with Nassar’s argument that Price Waterhouse was controlling even if the section 2000e-2(m) standard did not apply, stating
that the part of the Price Waterhouse framework which survived the
1991 amendment would still be inconsistent with the statutory interpretation of the word “because,” in light of Gross’s plain meaning interpretation of a substantially similar statute. In summation, the
Court proclaimed that “a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under
section 2000e-3(a) must establish that his or her protected activity

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id. at 2530.
Id. at 2531-32.
Id.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2533 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”135
However, not everything went according to plan for UTSMC,
as the Court denied grant of judgment as a matter of law and instead
remanded Nassar back to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.136
IV.

A VIGOROUS DISSENT

Justice Ginsburg authored a strong dissent, which was joined
by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.137 The dissent admonished the majority for seizing upon a provision that was “adopted by
Congress as part of an endeavor to strengthen Title VII, and turn[ing]
it into a measure reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.”138
Turning the plain language reasoning of the majority on its head, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that both Title VII’s main provision, section 2000e-2(a), and the subsection addressing retaliation, section
2000e-3(a), contain identical language addressing causation: “because of.”139 Wrongful discrimination and retaliation for reporting it
are so bound together, she wrote, as to be inextricable, as the Court
has repeatedly held.140 Because retaliation in response to discrimination is discrimination, Justice Ginsburg concluded that there is no
reason to apply a different standard of proof.141
The dissent also accused the majority of misapprehending the
lessons of past decisions and showing little regard for trial judges.142
The Court agreed that a motivating factor standard must be used for
establishing proof under section 2000e-2(a), so the majority was itself
complicating the adjudication process by requiring a higher standard
135

Id. at 2534.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
137
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138
Id. at 2535.
139
Id. at 2534. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.”).
140
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535; see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167,
179 n.3 (2005) (noting that discrimination and retaliation are intertwined).
141
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535.
142
Id.
136
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of proof for claims under section 2000e-3(a), which were often
brought together by a single claimant.143 This disparity will cause jurors to “puzzle over the rhyme or reason for the dual standards.”144
After its own recitation of the facts in Nassar, the dissent explored the Congressional intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.145
Looking to the House Reports written during the enactment of the
1991 legislation, Justice Ginsburg presented direct evidence that
Congress actually intended the amendments to provide additional
protections and “‘respon[d] to a number of . . . decisions by [this
Court] that sharply cut back on the scope and effectiveness’ of antidiscrimination laws.”146 Thus, the 1991 abrogation of Price Waterhouse was not meant to limit the scope of such discrimination claims,
but to expand them and provide additional protections.147 As further
proof, the dissent pointed out that section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the affirmative defense provision added during the 1991 amendments, did
not completely shield employers from liability, but merely limited
plaintiff’s remedies to declaratory or injunctive relief, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs.148
Next, asserting that the Court’s conclusions defied logic,149
the dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning, item by item. 150 Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Court’s categorization of retaliation
as a distinct concept from status-based discrimination ran afoul of
precedent.151 The dissent also called it “strange logic indeed to conclude that when Congress homed in on retaliation and codified the
proscription, as it did in Title VII, Congress meant [that] protection . .
. to have less force than the protection available when the statute does
not mention retaliation.”152
Characterizing the Court’s volte-face as “particularly imprudent,” the dissent rebuked the majority for defying congressional in-

143

Id.
Id.
145
Id. at 2538.
146
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2538; see H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. II, pp. 2-4 (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 695-96.
147
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
148
Id. at 2539.
149
Id. at 2545.
150
Id. at 2541-47.
151
Id. at 2541; see Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174.
152
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (emphasis added).
144
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tent to toughen antidiscrimination laws.153 With underwhelming arguments, the majority had misinterpreted a clear message from Congress, and this was the reason why it could not point to a single instance in which an antidiscrimination law was found not to cover
retaliation.154
The dissent then questioned the majority’s dismissal of EEOC
guidelines.155 By unfairly refusing to accord the EEOC any deference, the dissent claimed that the Court’s adoption of a heightened
standard creates a system in which proven retaliation is permitted to
go unpunished.156 This was a point the EEOC recognized.157
In the next main focal point of the dissent, Justice Ginsburg
attacked the Court’s reading of Gross and subsequent application in
Nassar.158 While the Court in Gross took great pains to distinguish
between ADEA claims and Title VII claims, the dissent charged the
majority with now attempting to invoke a uniform interpretation.159
According to the majority, the employer in Gross prevailed because
the ADEA was not like Title VII, but the employer in Nassar should
prevail because there is “no meaningful textual difference” between
the ADA and Title VII.160 To Justice Ginsburg, this was the equivalent to saying: “heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses.”161
Instead, she urged that a standard principle of statutory interpretation
should apply—that identical phrases appearing in the same statute
should be construed to have the same meaning.162 Thus, Title VII’s
retaliation provision should be governed by the same standard of causation as its status-based counterpart, which permits mixed motive
claims.163
The dissent then categorized the majority as insensitive to trial judges.164 Given that causation is a complicated concept to explain
to a jury under even the best of circumstances, a verdict requiring
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 2542.
Id.
Id. at 2543-44.
Id. at 2544.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2544.
Id. at 2544-45.
Id.
Id. at 2545.
Id.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2545.
Id.
Id. at 2546.
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multiple standards of causation was inappropriate, given that the governing statute did not require double standards, and was “virtually
certain to sow confusion” upon practical application.165
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the “substantial factor” theory of causation poked holes in the majority’s argument that but-for
causation was “textbook tort law.”166 As previously made evident by
the arguments presented and rejected in Price Waterhouse, “a strict
but-for test is particularly ill-suited to employment discrimination
cases,” considering that motive is based on subjective intent.167 The
dissent argued that this was precisely the reason that Congress considered and rejected an amendment which would have placed the
word “solely” before “because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” because elevating the standard would render the Act “totally nugatory.”168
Closing, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s decision as
being at odds with the Court’s jurisprudential history.169 With “zeal
to reduce the number of retaliation claims,” the majority overreached
both precedent and congressional intent.170 In its effort to shield employers, the dissent admonished the majority for “reach[ing] outside
of Title VII to arrive at an interpretation of ‘because’ that lacks sensitivity to the realities of life at work.”171
Yet, while Justice Ginsburg took the majority to task for its
unspoken motives, she did little to address the judicial resource concerns behind the majority’s holding. Other than pointing out that it
seemed driven to reduce the number of retaliation claims, the dissent
failed to address whether the majority’s concerns were at all legitimate or relevant to the appropriate standard of causation. In balancing those interests, perhaps the heightened causation policy might be
considered sound after all. Congress could choose to ratify the majority and codify the holding in Nassar, in which case committee reports will provide a good indication of whether Congress considered
165

Id.
Id.
167
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547; see Gross, 557 U.S. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547; see 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837-38 (1964) (commenting
that a sole cause standard would render the Act “totally nugatory,” New Jersey Republican
Senator Clifford Case partnered with Pennsylvania Democrat Joseph Clark to advocate the
adoption of motivating factor language within Title VII).
169
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547.
170
Id.
171
Id.
166
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chilling retaliation claims and lightening court dockets to be unspoken directives from the case.
As far as the left side of the Court is concerned, with the majority having issued the opinion, it is now up to the legislature to formally express its intent by modifying the retaliation statute to be
more specific. Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, this “misguided judgment . . . should prompt yet another Civil Rights Restoration Act.”172 By formally declaring a lower uniform standard of causation, the legislature could decisively put this debate to rest once and
for all. Justifications for such a policy are not only logical, but also
firmly rooted in American legislative history. Historically underprivileged classes are entitled to suspect status classification. To afford
any real protection, policy-makers cannot merely prohibit employment discrimination based on an employee’s status. Congress must
also afford heightened protection for the courageous employee who
actually reports being abused because of that immutable characteristic. It is pointless to afford heightened scrutiny to the treatment of a
class, only to relax scrutiny for treatment in retaliation to complaints
made in the class’s defense. However, even if logic is on Justice
Ginsburg’s side, with a stalled Congress and an employer-friendly
socio-political environment, it will likely be some time before such
an Act passes through Congress.
In a per curiam opinion delivered on August 1, 2013, the Fifth
Circuit vacated the district court’s decision in its entirety and remanded the case back to the trial court for proceedings consistent
with the Supreme Court’s opinion.173 That case is still pending as of
the time this case note was written.
V.

IMPLICATIONS ON STATE DISCRIMINATION LAWS

The Nassar decision may also prove to be significant for its effect on analogous state discrimination and retaliation laws. Although
state discrimination laws operate independently of federal civil rights
legislation, it is reasonable to assume that the Court’s interpretation
will influence state judges and legislators alike. While brevity precludes extensive analysis, a comparison between the federal approach
and that adopted by New York may prove instructive to understanding
the implications of the Nassar holding.
172
173

Id.
Nassar v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 537 F. App’x 525, 525 (5th Cir. 2013).
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New York pioneered legislation to prohibit employment discrimination in 1945, making it the first state in the nation to ban status-based prejudice in the workplace.174 Although the Ives-Quinn
Anti-Discrimination Law only recognized race, creed, color, and national origin as protected classes, it was re-named the New York
State Human Rights Law and has been substantially expanded “to
stay current with the changing American culture and with the needs
of New Yorkers.”175 The current law protects additional classes, including gender, sexual orientation, marital status, military status, and
physical disability.176
New York has also expanded protection outside of the sphere
of employment to regulate housing, finance and banking, accommodations, and non-sectarian educational institutions.177 However, although
New York has taken a more expansive view toward protected classes,
when it comes to retaliation claims the New York State Court of Appeals has looked to the federal courts for guidance. On several occasions, the court has noted that “ ‘[b]ecause both the [New York] Human Rights Law and Title VII address the same type of discrimination,
afford victims similar forms of redress, are textually similar and ultimately employ the same standards of recovery, federal case law . . .
proves helpful to the resolution of [New York state claims].’ ”178
Knowing the persuasive force of federal case law, New York civil
rights lawyers can do little more than wait and see if the heightened
federal retaliation standard will impact their causation burden in future
state discrimination claims.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is ironic that a federal law designed to prevent discrimination has been itself interpreted to discriminate among and between
protected classes and activities. Although valid Title VII claims generally should still survive prima facie scrutiny, the heightened causa174

Agency History, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.dhr.ny.go
v/agency-history (last visited May 2, 2014).
175
Id.
176
Mission Statement, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.dhr.ny.
gov/mission-statement (last visited May 2, 2014).
177
Id.
178
Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1006 n.3 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting
Matter of Aurecchione v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 771 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.
2002)).
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tion standard will unquestionably reduce the number of retaliation
cases that ultimately make it to trial. Thus, the majority accomplished what the dissent claimed to be its target objective. But, it
may have come at the expense of aggrieved employees, who will be
unable to satisfy the higher standard of causation with only limited
circumstantial proofs. Unless the legislature intervenes and formally
establishes a lower standard, it is likely that the Court’s majority will
gradually begin to insist on applying but-for causation to all employment discrimination claims. If that trend continues, the once ubiquitous Title VII claim will become just another relic of a bygone era in
United States constitutional history.
Darren Stakey
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